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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant, Jamaal Mike, was convicted by a jury of 
aiding and abetting the receipt of a firearm acquired outside 
his state of residency, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and 
§ 924(a)(1)(D); and unauthorized possession of a firearm in 
violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  He appeals 
these convictions, arguing that there were three problems with 
his trial.  First, he says that the District Court erred when it 
failed to give use immunity to a co-defendant; second, he says 
that he is entitled to a judgment of acquittal because there was 
no evidence that the firearm he was convicted of possessing 
was capable of discharging ammunition; and finally, he says 
that he was entitled to a judgment of acquittal based on an 
affirmative defense under Virgin Islands law.  We find these 
arguments unpersuasive and, for the reasons set forth below, 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
I. 
On April 10, 2009, Fenyang Ouma Francis put down a 
deposit to purchase an AK-47 rifle and two 30-round 
magazines at Rieg's Gun Shop in Orlando, Florida.  He 
completed the purchase the next day.  Ten days later, on April 
21, 2009, U.S. postal inspectors in San Juan, Puerto Rico, 
intercepted a package addressed to a man named Imon 
Thomas with a post office box in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands.  
Their investigation revealed that the package's return address 
was false and that the post office box in the shipping address 
was not registered to Imon Thomas.  Intrigued, the postal 
inspectors x-rayed the package and saw a firearm inside.  
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After securing a search warrant, they opened the package and 
discovered an AK-47 covered in grease and two 30-round 
magazines.  The postal inspectors then removed the weapon 
from the box and "dry fired" it to test whether it was operable.  
It was.  After that, they removed the AK-47's firing bolt, 
placed it back in the box, and sent the firearm on its way to 
St. Thomas in a controlled delivery designed to apprehend the 
would-be owner. 
The next day found the prospective gun owner, Jamaal 
Mike, travelling to the Frenchtown post office in St. Thomas 
with Lucas Reid, Jr., and Dwayne Hunte, a 17-year old 
juvenile that Mike and Reid had met along the side of the 
road.  When the group arrived at the post office, Reid and 
Mike went inside while Hunte met his mother at a nearby 
McDonald's.  After a few minutes Mike and Reid left the post 
office empty-handed, went back to Hunte, and drove to the 
Sugar Estate post office.  There, Mike gave Reid a slip of 
paper with a tracking number on it.  Reid and Hunte then 
entered the Sugar Estate post office to retrieve a package, but 
were told that the package was back at the Frenchtown post 
office.  The group circled around to Frenchtown.  When they 
arrived, Mike gave Hunte a slip of paper, this one with the 
name Imon Thomas written on it.  Hunte and Reid went 
inside the post office and retrieved a card from a post office 
box belonging to Reid's father.  Reid gave the card to Hunte, 
who stood in line and handed the card to a postal employee.  
When the employee brought Hunte a package, Hunte signed 
for it under the name Imon Thomas.  Reid and Hunte then 
carried the package to Reid's car, where Mike was waiting.  
So were the police.  Once the package was placed in the car, 
federal agents approached the vehicle and arrested Reid, 
Mike, and Hunte, none of whom had a license to possess a 
firearm. 
Francis was also arrested.  He subsequently pleaded 
guilty to shipping a firearm in the mail and to transferring a 
firearm to an out-of-state resident.  During his plea 
negotiations, he told his attorney that neither Mike nor Reid 
knew what was in the package he addressed to Imon Thomas.  
Francis's attorney told the Government that Francis would 
testify on Mike and Reid's behalf and the Government 
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disclosed this fact to Mike and Reid.  On October 19, 2009, 
Mike subpoenaed Francis. 
Francis moved to quash the subpoena the very next 
day, October 20.  That same day—the first day of the trial—
Mike asked for a continuance to investigate Francis's offer to 
testify.  The District Court denied the motion.  Mike then 
asked the Court to grant Francis use immunity.  The Court 
denied the motion, concluding that Francis's testimony would 
not be clearly exculpatory:  "I don't think there's any basis for 
[use immunity] at this point.  It sounds like it would be a 
credibility issue.  And that's something that would take it, I 
think, out of the realm of clearly exculpatory, which I think is 
a baseline requirement in order to, for the Court to even go 
any further."  (App. 174-75).  Mike moved for a judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the government's case and again after 
the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.  The 
District Court denied the motions.   Mike was subsequently 
sentenced to fifty-one-month sentences of imprisonment on 
each of the counts of conviction, to be served concurrently.  
Mike appeals the denial of each of the above motions. 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We have jurisdiction under the 
authority provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
 Mike argues on appeal that the District Court was 
wrong to deny the request to give Francis use immunity.  We 
review the District Court’s factual determinations regarding 
the likely effect of undisclosed information for clear error and 
its ultimate decision not to immunize a defense witness for an 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 
348 (3d Cir. 2002).
1
  We see no error. The District Court did 
                                              
1
 Our decision in United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357 (3d 
Cir. 2004) did not set forth the standard of review.  In that 
case, the appellant failed to present his judicial immunity 
argument to the district court.  Id. at 362 (citing Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 52(b)); see also id. at 365-66.  "Failure to object at trial, 
absent plain error, constitute a waiver of the issue for post-
trial purposes."  United States v. Tiller, 302 F.3d 98, 105 (3d 
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not abuse its discretion when it declined Mike's request to 
grant Francis use immunity because the failure to grant 
Francis immunity did not deprive Mike of his constitutional 
due process right to present clearly exculpatory evidence 
necessary to obtain a fair trial. 
 The Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution states that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."  U.S. 
Const. amend. V.  In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Supreme 
Court recognized that this due process right is "in essence, the 
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's 
accusations."  410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).  For this reason, the 
Chambers court held that Mississippi's strict rules of 
evidence, which prevented Leon Chambers from cross-
examining a witness who had confessed to the same crime 
and prevented him from entering into evidence other 
admissions of the witness's guilt, violated Chambers's right to 
due process by effectively denying him a fair trial.  Id. at 285, 
302.   
 Chambers recognizes the proposition that criminal 
defendants possess a "due process right to have clearly 
exculpatory evidence presented to the jury, at least when 
there is no strong countervailing systemic interest that 
justifies its exclusion."  United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 
1191, 1204 (3d Cir. 1978).  That recognition proved to be the 
answer to the question presented in Government of the Virgin 
Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980):  If a 
defendant's right to due process can be violated by strict rules 
of evidence that prevent a defendant from presenting clearly 
exculpatory evidence to the jury, can that same right also be 
violated by the failure to affirmatively grant immunity to an 
available defense witness who will not testify under grounds 
of self-incrimination when the witness is likely to offer 
clearly exculpatory testimony?  Smith said "yes," observing 
that the latter violation is "not different in substance than the 
violation found in Chambers." Id. at 970.  Indeed, cases like 
Chambers; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 
(holding that an indigent defendant cannot have a fair trial 
                                                                                                     
Cir. 2002).  Thus, in Thomas, the scope of our review was 
limited to plain error. 
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without being provided counsel) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that a defendant cannot present an 
effective case when the government suppresses material 
exculpatory evidence), recognize that a major purpose of a 
criminal trial is to search for the truth, and that this purpose is 
not advanced by rules that "turn the trial into a mere 'poker 
game' to be won by the most skilled tactician."  Smith, 615 
F.2d at 971 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 
(1970)).  Thus, Smith highlighted the long-standing principle 
that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is violated 
when a defendant is deprived of "clearly exculpatory 
evidence necessary to present an effective defense."  Id. 
 After precisely identifying the right at issue, the Smith 
court focused on the means of protecting it, making the 
common-sense observation that "[a]ny remedy . . . must take 
into account the fact that a retrial would be meaningless 
unless the evidence in issue may be compelled."  Id.  In cases 
where a defense witness invokes the Fifth Amendment for 
fear of self-incrimination, the only way to compel this 
evidence is to grant immunity.  Id.  See Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972) (concluding that use 
immunity "is coextensive with the [Fifth Amendment] 
privilege and suffices to  supplant it").  For this reason, the 
Smith court drew upon precedents describing the "inherent 
judicial power to grant witness immunity in order to vindicate 
constitutional rights" and concluded that judicially-granted 
immunity could serve to remedy these types of due process 
violations.  Smith, 615 F.2d at 971  (citing, among other 
cases, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968)).   
However, because of the "unique and affirmative nature of 
the immunity remedy and fundamental considerations of 
separation of powers, grants of immunity to defense witnesses 
must be bounded by special safeguards and must be made 
subject to special conditions."  Id.  The Smith court imposed 
five such conditions, emphasizing that each must be met 
before the remedy of judicially-granted immunity is available: 
[1] immunity must be properly sought in the 
district court; [2] the defense witness must be 
available to testify; [3] the proffered testimony 
must be clearly exculpatory; [4] the testimony 
must be essential; and [5] there must be no 
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strong governmental interests which countervail 
against a grant of immunity. 
Id. at 972. 
 Mike's appeal is focused on the availability of the 
remedy of judicially-granted immunity.  The parties agree 
that the first two conditions for granting the remedy are 
satisfied.  The battle is over the last three, with particular 
emphasis on the condition that the proffered testimony be 
"clearly exculpatory."   
Our decision in United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357 
(3d Cir. 2004), guides our analysis as to whether Francis's 
testimony was clearly exculpatory.  In that case, the namesake 
defendant was arrested after drugs were found behind the 
glove box of his car.  Id. at 359.  Thomas's theory was that the 
car dealer who sold him the car, and the car dealer's assistant, 
planted the drugs.  Id. at 365.  He called each of them to 
testify, but they invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused.  
Id.  On appeal, Thomas argued that the district court should 
have granted the two witnesses immunity.  Reviewing for 
plain error, we concluded that the district court properly 
declined to offer immunity because the witnesses' testimony 
would not have been "clearly exculpatory."  Id.  We observed 
that judicial immunity may be properly denied when the 
exculpatory nature of testimony is "at best speculative."  Id. 
(quoting United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 251 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 1983)).  In Thomas's case, the testimony of two other 
witnesses "undercut" his theory that drugs were planted and 
"undermine[d]" his assertion that he didn't know there were 
drugs in his car.  Id. at 365 -66.  Accordingly, "[b]ecause a 
credibility determination would have been required in order 
to determine which parties were more credible," the 
testimony of the witnesses Thomas wanted immunized 
"would not have been 'clearly exculpatory[.]'"  Id. at 366. 
 The government says that the same is true in this case.  
Francis would have testified that he did not tell Mike what 
was in the package Mike helped pick up at the Frenchtown 
post office in the Virgin Islands.  However, Hunte testified 
that Mike gave him a slip of paper with the name Imon 
Thomas written on it in order to identify the package he 
wanted.  He further testified that, after their arrest and while 
8 
detained, Mike told Hunte "all it is, is a haircut," and that 
Hunte understood this to mean that Mike wanted Hunte to 
take the rap because all it would mean for Hunte was a 
juvenile conviction and a stay at the "Boy's Home."  (App. 
171-72).  According to the government, because the jury 
could have inferred from Hunte's statements that Mike knew 
what was in the package, Francis's testimony to the contrary 
would simply have created an issue of credibility, which it 
contends is not enough under Thomas to meet the condition 
that testimony be clearly exculpatory.  
 The Government's reading of Thomas is expansive.  Its 
view seems to be that testimony is never clearly exculpatory 
if the jury must weigh the credibility of the immunized 
witness against the credibility of other witnesses.  This is not 
the law.  In Smith we said that "[i]mmunity will be denied if 
the proffered testimony . . . is found to relate only to the 
credibility of the government's witnesses," 615 F.2d at 972 
(emphasis added), and in Ammar, we remarked that judicial 
immunity is improper when the proffered testimony is "at 
best speculative," 714 F.2d at 251 n.8.  Nothing in these cases 
rules out the possibility that a defense witness's testimony can 
be clearly exculpatory when it helps to establish, among other 
things, that a government witness's testimony is not credible.  
Of course, we found no error in the failure to grant immunity 
in Thomas "[b]ecause a credibility determination would be 
required in order to determine which parties were more 
credible," 357 F.3d at 366, but this was not the sole reason for 
our decision.  Elsewhere, we emphasized that there was other 
evidence to "undercut" and "undermine" Thomas's theory of 
the case.  Id. at 365-66.   
 Here, as in Thomas, there is evidence in the record 
undercutting the testimony Francis might have given and 
Mike's theory of the case.  Hunte's testimony is one such 
piece of evidence.  Mike's phone records are another.  At trial, 
a postal inspector testified that Francis, Mike and Reid 
exchanged numerous telephone calls on the days the AK-47 
was purchased, the day the AK-47 was sent into the mail, and 
the day the AK-47 was picked up at the post office.  (App. 
299-307).  This testimony, too, undermines Mike's claim of 
ignorance.  Thus, in Mike's trial, as in Thomas's, the jury was 
confronted with more than just a credibility determination.  In 
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both cases, the testimony from the witness the defendant 
wanted immunized may have helped the defendant, but it was 
far from necessary to ensure a fair trial.   
 Since the five Smith conditions had not been satisfied, 
the District Court could not have granted immunity to 
Francis.  A district court cannot abuse its discretion when it 
fails to give a remedy that is not in its power to give.   
 Our holding should not be interpreted to foreclose 
judicially-granted immunity in similar cases, so long as the 
five Smith conditions are satisfied.  Ultimately, the question 
of whether clearly exculpatory evidence is necessary to 
present an effective defense is a decision calling upon the 
sound judgment of the district court judge in a position to 
listen to the witnesses and evaluate the tenor of trial 
narratives.  Our role is not to substitute the judgment we 
might reach after reading the record for the judgment of a 
district court judge who actually saw that record develop live 
in a courtroom.  The law tolerates differences of opinion and 
our role on appeal is simply to make sure that those 
differences stay within certain bounds.  In this case the 
boundaries of acceptable decision making are defined by the 
abuse of discretion standard, which compels us to accept the 
considered judgment of the District Court unless its decision 
is "arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable."  United States 
v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 239 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Based 
on the record presented in this appeal, the District Court's 
ruling was clearly within the bounds of reasonable decision 
making because there was no indication that Mike's right to a 
fair trial was in jeopardy.  The District Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it declined to grant Francis use immunity.  
III. 
 Mike also says that the District Court was wrong to 
deny his motion for a judgment of acquittal because he did 
not possess a "firearm" as that word is defined by Title 23, 
section 451(d) of the Virgin Islands code. We exercise 
plenary review over the grant or denial of a motion for 
acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, 
applying the same standard as the District Court.  United 
States v. Silveus, 542 F.3d 993, 1002 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus, 
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we look to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to 
support the conviction, Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, but in doing so, 
we are mindful that "[i]t is not for us to weigh the evidence or 
to determine the credibility of the witnesses."  United States 
v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United 
States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1989)).  
Instead, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the government and sustain the verdict "if any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt."  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 
180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1080). 
 In the Virgin Islands, "[w]hoever, unless otherwise 
authorized by law . . . possesses . . . either actually or 
constructively . . . any firearm, as defined in Title 23, section 
451(d) of [the Virgin Islands] code" is subject to 
imprisonment.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  A firearm, 
as defined by § 451(d), is "any device by whatever name 
known, capable of discharging ammunition by means of gas 
generated from an explosive composition, including any air 
gas or spring gun or any 'BB' pistols or 'BB' guns that have 
been adapted or modified to discharge projectiles as a 
firearm." V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 451(d). 
 In his brief, Mike argues that his motion should have 
been granted because the testimony at trial showed that the 
AK-47 was delivered without its firing bolt and was therefore 
inoperable.  However, at oral argument, Mike shifted tack, 
instead arguing that the problem was that there was no 
evidence at trial showing that the weapon had ever been test 
fired and shown to be capable of firing a bullet.  The record 
demonstrates otherwise.  When asked at trial whether he had 
test-fired the weapon, postal inspector Mitchell Perez 
answered that "we dry-fired it."  (App. 148).  He also testified 
that the AK-47 presented to him at trial was the same one he 
found inside the package addressed to Imon Thomas when it 
was intercepted in Puerto Rico.  Later in the trial, Senior 
Special Agent Felix Rios, from the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives testified that he test-fired 
that same weapon in August 2009 and concluded "that the 
weapon was operable, and that it was, will fire in 
semiautomatic mode."  (App. 157.)  
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 Viewing the above evidence in the light most 
favorable to the government, we conclude that a rational jury 
could have concluded that the AK-47 was capable of 
discharging ammunition.  We thus affirm the District Court's 
order denying Mike's Rule 29 motion. 
IV. 
 As stated previously, the Virgin Islands prohibits 
possession of a firearm "unless otherwise authorized by law."  
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  In United States v. McKie, 
we decided that § 470 of Title 23 of the Virgin Islands code 
essentially "authorized by law" the possession of a firearm in 
the period before a person is required to report the receipt of 
the firearm to the Virgin Islands Police Commission.  112 
F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 1997).  In doing so, § 470 created an 
affirmative defense to the crime of unlawful possession.  Id.  
When the defendant in McKie was arrested, § 470 gave him 
24 hours to report the fact that he had obtained a firearm, but 
by the time his case was presented to this Court the statute 
had been amended into its current form to provide that 
firearms obtained from outside the Virgin Islands must be 
reported "immediately."  Id. at 632.   
Mike argues that his motion for a judgment of acquittal 
should have been granted, or that the jury should have been 
instructed on his affirmative defense under § 470, because the 
trial testimony demonstrated that he was arrested 
"immediately" after obtaining the AK-47.  The Government 
counters that the evidence presented at trial makes it obvious 
that Mike had absolutely no intention of reporting the gun, 
"immediately" or any time thereafter.  To which Mike 
responds that McKie made clear that a defendant does not 
need to prove intent to report in order to obtain the § 470 
affirmative defense.  Id. at 632 ("If the legislature meant to 
include 'intent to report' as part of the defense, it did not say 
so."). 
We agree with the Government that Mike was not 
entitled to a judgment of acquittal or a jury instruction on the 
affirmative defense.  In McKie, we explained that "'intent to 
report' was not an element of the affirmative defense of 
firearm possession for less than twenty-four hours as it 
existed under § 470, before its recent amendment." Id.  
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(emphasis added).  When the Virgin Islands legislature 
substituted the 24-hour period to report in § 470 for a time 
period defined by the word "immediately," it fundamentally 
changed the nature of the affirmative defense.  The McKie 
court intimated as much, explaining that "the legislature 
wanted to close the loophole created by the twenty-four hour 
grace period."  Id. (citing Hearing on Bill No. 21-0219 to 
amend Title 23, Section 470 of the Virgin Islands Code, Reg. 
Sess. (V.I. Aug. 29, 1996)).  "Immediately" means "instantly; 
at once" or "with no object or space intervening."  Webster's 
Unabridged Dictionary 957 (2d ed.1998).  By using this term 
the Virgin Islands legislature accomplished its objective, 
eliminating the use of § 470 as a viable affirmative defense in 
the vast majority of cases by collapsing the time period for 
reporting into nothing.   
The only way a person can "immediately" report the 
receipt of a firearm is to conscientiously set out with that 
intent and provide the report when the firearm is obtained.  
The evidence at trial revealed that the AK-47 was slathered in 
grease to mask its scent from curious canines, that the gun 
was inside a package addressed to a fictitious person named 
Imon Thomas, and that Mike convinced a juvenile to pick up 
the package for him under the assumed name of the fictitious 
addressee.  The evidence was clear that Mike had no intent to 
"immediately" report the receipt of the firearm.  Without such 
evidence, Mike was not entitled to a jury instruction on the 
affirmative defense and, even if one had been given, no 
rational trier of fact could have used it as the basis for an 
acquittal.  See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Carmona, 
422 F.2d 95, 101 (3d Cir. 1970) (concluding that defendant 
was not entitled to jury instruction where there was no 
evidence to support it). 
V. 
We find no merit to Mike's argument that the District 
Court abused its discretion when it failed to grant use 
immunity to a co-defendant.  We similarly find unpersuasive 
the argument that Mike did not possess a "firearm" as that 
word is defined by Virgin Islands statute.  And there is no 
evidence in the record that would have warranted a jury 
instruction on an affirmative defense under V.I. Code. Ann. 
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Tit. 23, § 470.  For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
of the District Court is affirmed.  
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McKee, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
Although I agree with the majority‟s conclusion that 
there was sufficient evidence to convict Jamaal Mike of being 
in possession of a firearm, I write separately to clarify how 
courts should interpret the definition of “firearm” under 23 
V.I.C. § 451. In addition, I can not agree that the district court 
properly denied use immunity because I believe that 
circumstantial evidence that does not directly contradict the 
testimony of a proposed defense witness is insufficient to 
negate the otherwise clearly exculpatory nature of such 
testimony.  I therefore believe that the district court erred in 
not granting use immunity pursuant to our decision in Gov’t 
of Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964, 972 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
Accordingly, I dissent from my colleagues‟ use immunity 
analysis and thus can not concur in the judgment. 
 
I. The Definition of a Firearm Under VI Law 
 
The facts relevant to Mike's receipt of a “firearm” were 
not disputed at trial: a ballistics expert testified that the gun 
that was mailed to Mike was operable when law enforcement 
agents intercepted it. An agent then removed the bolt from the 
gun, rendering it inoperable.  The gun was then forwarded to 
Mike, and the bolt was mailed separately to another 
government official.  It was not included in the package Mike 
received.  Therefore, when Mike received the firearm, it was 
no longer “operable.” 
Mike argues that because the firearm was inoperable 
when he received it, he cannot be charged with violating 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a)
 1
, which criminalizes unauthorized 
                                                 
1
  The statute reads as follows:  
(a) Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by 
law, has, possesses, bears, transports or carries 
either, actually or constructively, openly or 
concealed any firearm, as defined in Title 23, 
2 
 
possession of a firearm.  A firearm is defined under the 
Virgin Islands Code as follows: 
 
(d) "Firearm" means any device by 
whatever name known, capable of 
discharging ammunition by means of gas 
generated from an explosive 
composition, including any air gas or 
spring gun or any "BB" pistols or "BB" 
guns that have been adapted or modified 
to discharge projectiles as a firearm. 
23 V.I.C. § 451 (emphasis added).   
Mike relies on two cases to argue that a firearm must 
be operable under 23 V.I.C. § 451(d) to sustain a conviction 
for illegal possession of a firearm.
2
 Neither is persuasive.  In 
Virgin Islands v. Henry, 232 F. App‟x. 170 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(unpublished), we  simply noted in the procedural history 
that: 
the Appellate Division [of the Virgin 
Islands]  . . . agreed [with the petitioner] 
that the government had failed to offer 
evidence showing that one of the guns 
retrieved at the scene was operable (i.e., 
capable of discharging ammunition). 
Accordingly, the Court reversed Henry's 
conviction with respect to the count 
                                                                                                             
section 451(d) of this code, loaded or unloaded, 
may be arrested without a warrant[.]   
    14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) 
2
 The government does not dispute that § 451(d) requires that 
a firearm be capable of firing ammunition.  It counters, 
however, that the firearm was operable when it was mailed, 
and “but-for” its intervention, the firearm would have been 
operable when Mike received it.  The government cites no 
cases in its favor, and a review of relevant case law finds no 
support for this proposition. 
 
3 
 
involving the gun that was not shown to 
be operable and affirmed his conviction 
with respect to the remaining gun [which 
was shown to be operable.] 
Id. at 173.  However, in reaching our holding we did not 
determine whether a firearm must be operable in order to be a 
firearm under 23 V.I.C. § 451(d).  In the second case, the 
District Court of the Virgin Islands held: “To prove this 
charge [possession of an unlicensed firearm], the government 
must show that the firearm was operable.” Virgin Islands v. 
Albert, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14466 (D.Ct. V.I. 1980) 
(citing 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) and 23 V.I.C.. § 451(d)).  Neither 
case is analogous to the situation here where a firearm that 
was capable of discharging ammunition is subsequently 
rendered inoperable by law enforcement officials and then 
forwarded to a defendant to take possession of it as part of a 
criminal investigation.
3
 
 
I agree that the gun that Mike received qualifies as a 
“firearm,” but my analysis of that issue diverges a bit from 
that of my colleagues. The majority writes:  
 
In his brief, Mike argues that his motion 
should have been granted because the 
testimony at trial showed that the AK-47 
was delivered without its firing bolt and 
was therefore inoperable.  However, at 
oral argument, Mike shifted tack, instead 
arguing that the problem was that there 
was no evidence at trial showing that the 
weapon had ever been test fired and 
shown to be capable of firing a bullet.  
The record demonstrates otherwise.   
                                                 
3
 Mike‟s list of cases is not exhaustive.  Although other cases 
similarly use the word “operable” and “capable of 
discharging ammunition” interchangeably, none of those 
cases are binding. 
4 
 
Maj. Op. at 18.  My colleagues then conclude that because 
there was evidence that the firearm was operable when the 
government tested it, a rational jury could have concluded 
that the AK-47 was capable of discharging ammunition.  
 
Although I agree with the majority‟s conclusion, I do 
not think it is at all relevant that defense counsel “shifted 
tack” at oral argument.  Although Mike‟s attorney stated that 
there was no evidence regarding whether the weapon was 
ever “dry-fired” by the government, it appears that he was 
merely confused about the record. Mike‟s counsel did not 
concede the issue in his brief.  
 
Accordingly, I think we should take this opportunity to 
decide directly that the Virgin Islands statute applies to a 
weapon that is capable of firing when placed into the mail, 
but subsequently is rendered inoperable by law enforcement 
agents before sending it on its way to a defendant in order to 
make a controlled delivery.  Addressing the issue more 
directly will eliminate any possibility that law enforcement 
agents may believe they have to place a “live” weapon into 
the mail in order to prove a violation of this and similar 
statutes.  
 
To establish a violation of § 2253(a), the government 
must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable 
doubt:  (1) the defendant did possess, bear, transport or carry, 
“either, actually or constructively, openly or concealed” (2) 
“any firearm, as defined in Title 23, section 451(d) of this 
code, loaded or unloaded.”  23 V.I.C. § 451(d) defines a 
firearm as “any device by whatever name known, capable of 
discharging ammunition by means of gas generated from an 
explosive composition . . . .” 
 
However, § 451(d) does not require that a firearm be 
“operable.”  Instead, its plain language requires only that the 
device be “capable of discharging ammunition by means of 
gas generated from an explosive composition . . . .” 23 V.I.C. 
§ 451(d) (emphasis added). 
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The word “capable” is not synonymous with the word 
“operable.”  Merriam-Webster‟s dictionary defines “capable” 
as “having traits conducive to or features permitting.”  
Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/capable (last visited June 21, 2011). 
The Oxford English Dictionary (“OED”) defines “capable” as 
“having room or capacity for.”  Capable Definition, Oxford 
English Dictionary (Online Version), 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/27354 (last visited June 21, 
2011).  
 
The OED defines “operable” as “able to be operated.” 
Operable Definition, Oxford English Dictionary (Online 
Version), http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/131732 (last 
visited June 21, 2011).  Thus, a firearm may be “capable” of 
discharging ammunition, but not “operable,” if it has the 
potential to fire ammunition, or the “capacity for” discharging 
ammunition, but cannot do so at the relevant time.  
 
Here, the AK-47 was certainly capable of discharging 
ammunition, as the government‟s evidence established. 
Although the AK-47 that Mike received lacked one part — 
the bolt — the firearm still had “features permitting” it to 
discharge ammunition, including a barrel, functioning trigger, 
piston, hammer, buttstock, grip and magazine.  All of these 
were in perfect working order.  Although a firearm that is 
missing a bolt may not be operable until the missing bolt is 
replaced, it nevertheless has the “capacity for” discharging 
ammunition.   
 
More importantly, requiring such a firearm to be 
“operable” would violate the plain language of 23 V.I.C. § 
451(d), which explicitly states that a gun need not be loaded 
in order to be considered a firearm.  An unloaded firearm is 
"inoperable," since it cannot discharge ammunition.  Section 
451(d)‟s language, permitting a device to be considered a 
firearm even if it is unloaded, reflects an overwhelming 
legislative concern that the statute not be limited to firearms 
that could be fired at a given moment.  Rather, the legislature 
was clearly concerned about the potential for firing 
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ammunition and crafted the definition of “firearm” 
accordingly. 
 
Interpreting the statute in this manner does not broaden 
23 V.I.C. § 451(d) to include weapons that should not fairly 
be considered firearms.  Neither a scope, nor even the missing 
bolt without the rest of the weapon, would constitute a 
firearm under § 451(d), because such parts and accessories do 
not have the capacity to fire ammunition.  They may facilitate 
firing a weapon, but they are not capable of inflicting harm 
unless affixed to the actual firearm or integrated into it.   
Doing so is what allows the weapon to function as a 
“firearm;” and attaching such parts or accessories or 
integrating them into the weapon results in an altogether 
different “device” than such items standing alone.4 
 
In sum, I believe that the government need only prove 
that the device MIke received was “capable of discharging 
ammunition.” in order to prove a violation of 14 V.I.C. § 
2253(a). The testimony that agents were able to successfully 
“dry fire” the gun that Mike received was sufficient to prove 
that here. Removing the bolt rendered the AK-47 inoperable, 
but the weapon was still “capable” of firing ammunition. It 
was no less capable of that when Mike received it than if it 
had arrived unloaded but fully intact. 
 
                                                 
4
 Additionally, the more restrictive definition of 
“firearm” urged by Mike yields illogical results as evidenced 
here.  This statute is clearly aimed at the illegal flow of guns 
and the carnage and devastation they cause. Mike‟s 
interpretation of the statute would have required law 
enforcement officers who knew that a package contained an 
assault weapon to place that fully functioning weapon back 
into the stream of commerce in order to successfully complete 
an investigation while hoping that it would not be lost, 
delivered to the wrong party, or fall into the hands of minors 
or criminals along the way.  It is inconceivable that any 
legislature would intentionally require such a result in 
enacting this kind of statute.   
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II. Use Immunity 
Mike also appeals the district court‟s refusal to grant 
use immunity to Fenyang Francis, who purportedly told his 
attorney that Mike did not know that there was a gun in the 
package he received.  The majority finds that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion because Francis‟s testimony is not 
“clearly exculpatory.”  I disagree. 
 
For testimony to be “clearly exculpatory,” it cannot be 
“undercut by . . . prior inconsistent statement[s],” United 
States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 350 (3d. Cir 2002), or 
otherwise require a jury to make a credibility determination, 
United States v. Thomas, 357 F.3d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 
The majority relies heavily on Thomas in affirming the 
district court‟s denial of use immunity.  There, we found that 
the district court properly denied use immunity to two 
witnesses whom Thomas wanted to call to present a theory 
that another person, James Stager, a car dealer, had planted 
drugs in his car.  “[A]t least two other witnesses offered 
testimony that undercut Thomas' theory that Stager planted 
drugs in his car.”  Id. at 365. 
 
The first witness was “Thomas' girlfriend, Heather 
Barr, [who] testified that . . . Thomas told her that he already 
knew that drugs were in his car [and] that Thomas attempted 
to remove the drugs from his car in the police impoundment 
lot and fled to State College in order to avert being arrested 
when the police found the drugs.” Id. at 365-66. A second 
witness also undermined Thomas‟s argument that Stager had 
the opportunity to plant the drugs in Thomas‟s car because he 
testified that Thomas‟s car was not where Thomas claimed it 
was in his theory of the case.   
 
Since the testimony Thomas wanted to produce 
through immunized witnesses was in direct conflict with 
Thomas‟s theory of the case, the jury would have had to 
decide whether to believe the witnesses whom Thomas 
wanted immunized, or two non-immunized prosecutorial 
witnesses.  “Because a credibility determination would have 
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been required in order to determine which parties were more 
credible, [the testimony Thomas sought to admit] would not 
have been „clearly exculpatory,‟ as required under Smith.” 
Thomas, 357 F.3d at 366 (referencing Smith, 615 F.2d at 
972). 
 
Thomas is distinguishable.  That case reinforces the 
unremarkable notion that use immunity not be used as a 
license to commit perjury.  Here, the circumstantial evidence 
that the government presented that Mike knew the contents of 
the box does not clearly undercut Francis‟s proffered 
testimony.  In fact, Francis‟s testimony could explain the 
circumstantial evidence the government admitted in its case-
in-chief.  Unlike the testimony in Thomas, Francis‟s 
testimony here could have been accepted in a context that was 
completely compatible with evidence already admitted. 
 
As part of its case, the government was required to 
prove that Mike knew that a gun was in the package he 
received.  To prove this, the government presented two pieces 
of circumstantial evidence, which the majority cites as 
undermining the clearly exculpatory nature of Francis‟s 
potential testimony.   First, the majority cites the fact that, 
after they were arrested, Mike told Hunte that all he would 
get was “a haircut,” that is, go to juvenile detention.  
However, that only establishes that Mike knew some type of 
contraband was in the package, not that he knew it contained 
a gun.  In theory, he could have believed he was receiving a 
shipment of drugs of some other kind of contraband. 
Therefore, Francis‟s testimony could have been accepted 
without requiring the jury to chose between two competing 
statements if the jury believed Francis. 
 
Next, the majority points to multiple telephone calls 
between Francis and Mike confirming that the two 
communicated numerous times in the weeks surrounding the 
firearm shipment and often in the minutes before and after the 
purchase of the firearm and the shipment of the firearm.   
However, we do not know the content of these calls.  Without 
more, I do not believe we can assume enough about the 
substance of those conversations to justify denying use 
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immunity.  Although it is very easy to assume that Francis 
told Mike about the shipment of a firearm during at least one 
of those conversations,  that should be an argument that is left 
for the jury to resolve after hearing all of the relevant 
evidence.   In theory, Francis may have merely been 
confirming the receipt of contraband or the timing of the 
mailing of the package during those conversations.   
 
We have found that the “clearly exculpatory” standard 
for a use immunity analysis is “similar [to the] analysis [that] 
applies to [an] alleged Brady violation.”   United States v. 
Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 348 (3d Cir. 2002).  In Perez, we 
explained: 
Under Brady[,] . . . the suppression by 
the prosecution of evidence favorable to 
an accused warrants a new trial where 
“the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.” Evidence is material if 
there is a reasonable probability that, had 
it been disclosed, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  
Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted). 
 
It is hard to imagine evidence with a greater 
exculpatory potential than the person who shipped the 
package saying that Mike did not know it contained a gun.  
Of course, the jury would have been free to disregard that 
testimony if it thought that the other evidence established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mike knew he was receiving a 
gun, or if it otherwise found Francis lacking in credibility. “In 
Smith we said that „[i]mmunity will be denied if the proffered 
testimony . . . is found to relate only to the credibility of the 
government's witnesses,‟ and in Ammar, we remarked that 
judicial immunity is improper when the proffered testimony 
is „at best speculative[.]‟” Maj. Op. at 13 (citing Smith, 615 
F.2d at 972, and United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 251 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1983)) (emphasis removed).   
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However, I do not believe our precedent can be 
interpreted to preclude use immunity for Francis merely 
because his credibility would have been in issue had he 
testified.  Such a broad prohibition of use immunity would be 
tantamount to eliminating that tool altogether even when a 
witness‟s testimony was required to satisfy the requirements 
of due process
5
 because credibility is always an issue 
whenever any witness testifies. “Jurors are instructed . . . in 
almost all cases, that they are to determine the credibility of 
all witnesses who testify . . . even in the absence of an 
affirmative challenge to witness credibility.” United States v. 
Universal Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 666 (3d 
Cir. 2000) (en banc). The mere fact that Francis‟ credibility 
would have been aggressively attacked by the prosecutor 
should not be sufficient to undermine the due process 
interests of ensuring that a defendant is able to present a 
defense to a criminal charge.  Here, the district court‟s ruling 
deprived Mike of the only witness who could testify about 
Mike‟s knowledge of the contents of the package he received.  
 
The fact that such testimony would have made 
conviction more difficult if accepted by the jury is not a 
reason to deny a defendant access to favorable witnesses.
 
 
Each of the protections of the accused that were so carefully 
engrafted onto the Bill of Rights makes conviction of the 
guilty more difficult. That surely cannot be a reason to so 
narrow the doctrine of use immunity that defendants are 
denied access to fact witnesses.  The jury system rests upon 
the assumption that a properly instructed jury will be able to 
sort through the evidence and the arguments of counsel and 
determine if the government has proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
 
                                                 
5
  See Chambers v. Mississippi,  410 U.S. 284, 294 
(1973) (“The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses 
and to call witnesses in one's own behalf have long been 
recognized as essential to due process.”).  See also Maj. Op. 
at 5-6 (discussing Chambers, 410 U.S. 284). 
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Judicial use immunity exists to ensure due process.  
Although a jury will always be free to disregard the testimony 
of a defense witness, courts should not usurp the jury‟s 
function by deciding the credibility of a witness.   
 
III. Affirmative Defense Under 23 V.I.C. § 470 
 
Finally, before concluding, I think it helpful to state a 
concern and observation about the affirmative defense created 
by 14 V.I.C. § 470.  As the majority notes, in United States v. 
McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 1997), we held that there 
is an affirmative defense to possessing a firearm under Virgin 
Islands law because a person had 24 hours to register the 
weapon before it becomes illegal to possess it.  No doubt 
because of problems of proof, the Virgin Islands legislature 
amended § 470 to require “immediate” registration upon 
entering the Virgin Islands.  However, as this case illustrates, 
that amendment creates more problems than it solves.  It will 
often be impossible to rebut a claim of an intent to 
immediately register a firearm unless a defendant is given a 
sufficient opportunity to register it and fails to take any steps 
to do so upon entering the Virgin Islands.    
 
In theory, the only way to disprove such a defense in 
the ordinary case would be for the government to establish a 
registration desk adjacent to the exit of the airport lobby with 
signs instructing all who arrived that they had to go directly to 
the registration desk and register any firearms.  Experience 
with this statute has shown that police have a tendency to 
arrest a person with firearms as soon as he/she leaves the 
airport or takes possession of them rather than wait until 
circumstances are sufficient to refute any argument that the 
recipient intended to register the firearm.  
 
 Although that is perhaps understandable, the amended 
law creates real problems when an arrest occurs as soon as the 
recipient takes delivery of a weapon or leaves the airport 
building because there is no opportunity to immediately 
register the firearm. I agree that this complication does not 
assist Mike because all of the circumstances here supports the 
conclusion that he never intended to register the gun he 
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received in the first place.  Moreover, Mike's attempt to seek 
shelter under § 470 is undermined by his attempt to also argue 
that he did not know what was in the package he received. I 
therefore join my colleagues in rejecting Mike‟s defense here. 
However, the Virgin Islands legislature may wish to consider 
the problems the amendment to this statute could create in 
future cases so that police will not have to wait a sufficient 
time to rebut any suggestion of an intent to immediately 
register a weapon before making an arrest for a violation of § 
2253(a).
 6
 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, I concur that sufficient evidence proves 
that Mike violated 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a).  However, I believe 
that the court should have granted use immunity to Francis 
and thereby allowed Mike to present that defense testimony. 
 
                                                 
6
 Judge Smith joins in these concerns and observations 
concerning the amendment to Section 470. 
